Cybersecurity Infrastructure

Defending Tier 0: Advanced Active Directory Hardening

Priority

Critical

Hardening Phase

Execution

Standards

CIS & NIST

Securing Active Directory in 2026

Active Directory is still the main target for ransomware and lateral movement. Hardening it is not a one-time task. It is a continuous practice of shrinking the attack surface and enforcing least privilege, then testing that the controls still hold.

Critical Hardening Pillars

IDENTITY PROTECTION

1. Implement Tiered Administration

Protect your Domain Admins with the Enterprise Access Model. High-privilege accounts sign in only to high-privilege (Tier 0) systems, so a Domain Admin never logs on to a workstation where a credential harvester may be waiting.

Reinforce the model with the Protected Users group, authentication policies and silos, and Credential Guard on admin workstations.

GPO SECURITY

2. Disable Print Spooler on Domain Controllers

The Print Spooler service has been the source of serious vulnerabilities such as PrintNightmare. Unless a domain controller genuinely prints, disable the service. Apply it through Group Policy so it holds on every DC, including new ones.

# Run on each domain controller (or deploy via GPO)
Stop-Service -Name Spooler -Force
Set-Service -Name Spooler -StartupType Disabled
Get-Service -Name Spooler | Select-Object Name, Status, StartType
NETWORK HYGIENE

3. Restrict SMB and NTLM Traffic

Legacy protocols give attackers easy wins. Require SMB signing and use SMB encryption for sensitive shares. Windows Server 2025 already requires signing for outbound SMB connections by default, so enforce it consistently across older systems.

For NTLM, turn on auditing first, find what still depends on it, fix those dependencies and then restrict it. Microsoft is moving toward disabling NTLM by default in future Windows releases, so reducing it now is preparation. Kerberos armoring (FAST) is a separate control that protects Kerberos exchanges.

MONITORING

4. Honeytoken & Bait Accounts

Create “honeytoken” accounts with tempting names, for example Admin_Backup_Service. They need no real permissions and should never sign in. Any logon attempt or Kerberos ticket request for them should raise a high-severity alert in your SIEM.

CREDENTIAL HYGIENE

5. Enforce Windows Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS)

Lateral movement depends heavily on shared local administrator passwords. Use native Windows LAPS backed by Active Directory to rotate a unique, complex local admin password on every machine and store it in an encrypted AD attribute.

The schema update is a one-time, forest-wide change. Run it once with Update-LapsADSchema, then confirm the attributes exist:

# Confirm the Windows LAPS schema attributes exist
Get-ADObject -SearchBase (Get-ADRootDSE).SchemaNamingContext `
  -Filter "lDAPDisplayName -eq 'msLAPS-EncryptedPassword'" |
  Select-Object Name, DistinguishedName
KERBEROS HARDENING

6. Understanding Kerberoasting and the Vulnerability of SPNs

Kerberoasting is a common post-exploitation technique. Any authenticated domain user can request a service ticket (TGS) for an account with a Service Principal Name (SPN) and try to crack the service account’s password offline. To reduce the risk, audit accounts that have SPNs, use long random passwords, require AES encryption, and move services to Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSAs) wherever possible.

# List user accounts that have an SPN (excluding krbtgt)
Get-ADUser -Filter 'ServicePrincipalName -like "*"' -Properties ServicePrincipalName, PasswordLastSet |
  Where-Object SamAccountName -ne 'krbtgt' |
  Select-Object SamAccountName, PasswordLastSet, ServicePrincipalName
ACTIVE DIRECTORY HARDENING

7. Restricting Domain Join Permissions in Active Directory

By default, any authenticated user can join up to 10 computers to the domain. This lets an attacker or careless user add unmanaged machines. Set the ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota attribute to 0 and delegate the right to create computer objects to authorized administrative teams only.

# Set the machine account quota to 0 for the domain
Set-ADDomain -Identity (Get-ADDomain) -Replace @{'ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota' = '0'}
Get-ADObject -Identity (Get-ADDomain).DistinguishedName -Properties 'ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota'

Delegate “Create Computer objects” on the target OUs before you change this, or provisioning and imaging workflows will fail.

Recommended Toolkit

  • PingCastle: rapid Active Directory security assessment.
  • Purple Knight: finds indicators of exposure and compromise.
  • BloodHound Community Edition: maps attack paths to Tier 0.
  • Microsoft Defender for Identity: monitors on-premises identity signals from the cloud.